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Article: 
What options we have in a situation can clearly be of great moral significance. I shall argue that our 
options are far more restricted than is commonly thought. If I am right, then my argument has important 
moral implications. 
 
An option is an action that one can perform.
1
 The sort of "can" at issue is that which J. L. Austin called 
"all-in."
2
 Its analysis is controversial.
3
 I won't try to analyze it here; I hope that what I have in mind will 
be clear enough if I say that it is the sort of "can" that lies at the heart of the debates on free will and 
determinism and on whether "ought" implies "can." 
 
I shall proceed as follows. In section I, I shall present my argument, which will contain one premise 
(with three clauses) and a conclusion. In Section II I shall defend the principle of inference used. In 
Sections III-IV I shall defend the three clauses of the premise as best I can when they are taken 
individually. In Section VI, I shall defend the premise as a whole (by this time it will have undergone 
some modification). I shall conclude in Section VII with some brief observations about the moral 
implications of the argument. 
 
I. THE ARGUMENT 
Here is an initial, incomplete rendering of the argument: 
 
(A) (1) In any situation, very many of one's apparent options are actions which are such that 
(i) one cannot perform them unless one has certain conscious thoughts concerning them and 
(ii)one does not in fact have these thoughts. 
Hence: 
(2) In any situation, very many of one's apparent options are actions which one cannot in fact 
perform. 
 
Before moving to an evaluation of the argument, let me note just what is at stake in its conclusion. By 
"an apparent option" I don't mean an option which it in fact appears to someone (oneself or another) that 
one has; I mean, roughly, an option which a normal person would admit to having when asked whether 
it is (or was) an option that he or she has (or had) in the situation and when answering sincerely. For 
example, suppose that Joe, a normal person, forgot to keep an appointment. While it didn't occur to him 
to keep it, nonetheless, if he were asked whether it was an option of his, he would say that it was; 
indeed, he'd probably say that it was one he should have taken. Or again, suppose that Joe, eager to press 
his point of view, kept interrupting his interlocutor. While it didn't occur to him to keep his mouth shut, 
he would, if asked, admit that he could and should have done so. Or finally, suppose that Joe, listening 
to his favorite song on the radio, ran a red light and caused an accident. He'd admit that he could and 
should have been paying more attention to what he was doing. My contention (put bluntly and a little 
too boldly) is that, in all of these (and other such) cases, Joe is mistaken. None of the apparent options 
were actual options of his, and this is simply because performing them never crossed his mind. 
 
Let us now turn to an evaluation of the argument. It may appear that it goes awry in a familiar way. 
Consider this argument, which, apart from the absence of quantifiers, seems analogous to mine: 
 
(B) (1) (i) Jones cannot walk unless he moves his legs, and 
(ii) Jones does not in fact move his legs.  
Hence: 
(2) Jones cannot in fact walk. 
 
Clearly, something has gone wrong here, and the diagnosis is not hard to come by. Using obvious 
symbolism—obvious but, as we shall soon see, not entirely innocent—we may put the diagnosis as 
follows. It may at first be tempting to construe (B) as having this form (form "a"): 
 
(Ba) (1) (i) -m  -P(w) & 
(ii) -m  
Hence: 
(2) -P(w) 
 
But while this form of argument is valid, it is apparent that (Ba 1) does not capture what is meant by 
(B1). On the contrary, (B) would appear to have the following form: 
 
(Bb) (1) (i) -P(w & -m) & 
(ii) -m  
Hence: 
(2) -P(w) 
 
But now, it will be pointed out, although the first premise is true, the argument is invalid. (It is assumed 
that personal possibility—that which is ex-pressed by "P" and, in English, by "(all-in) can"—is wholly 
analogous to strict logical possibility.) 
 
I think that this dismissal of (B) is quite correct. But now consider this argument: 
 
(C) (1) (i) Smith cannot walk unless she has legs, and 
(ii) Smith in fact has no legs.  
Hence: 
(2) Smith cannot in fact walk. 
 
This seems much better than (B). Why? Presumably because it would not be a mistake to see it as 
having the following valid form: 
 
(Ca) (1) (i) –h  -P(w) & 
(ii) -h  
Hence: 
(2) -P(w) 
 
But now we need to enquire: why is it that (Bli) and (Cli) should be seen to have such different logical 
forms when, on the surface, they appear so similar? 
 
To answer this question, consider one way to modify (Bb) so that (B)'s form is apparently valid. The 
alteration is in the second clause of the premise: 
 
(Bc) (1) (i) -P(w & -m) & 
(ii) -P(m)  
Hence: 
(2) -P(w) 
 
If Jones cannot move his legs, then he cannot walk. (The principle of inference presupposed here seems 
to be this: 
 
(P1) -P(p & -q), -P(q) |- -P(p) 
 
Again, an analogy is apparently presupposed between personal possibility and strict logical possibility. 
For, where the latter is substituted for the former in (P1), we have an acceptable principle.
4
) This 
alteration to the argument, though, while rendering it valid, does not succeed in rendering it sound. For 
(Bc 1 ii), we may assume, is false; even if Jones doesn't move his legs, he can. 
 
In this respect, though, arguments (B) and (C) differ. Not only does Smith have no legs, it is not 
personally possible for her to have any; that is, roughly, she can do nothing about her legless condition.
5
 
It is this implicit understanding of the difference between Jones's and Smith's situations that accounts for 
the difference between the arguments. That is, while (Ca) does capture the form of (C), the following 
would render explicit what is at issue in (C): 
 
(Cd) (1) (i) -P(w & -h) & 
(ii) -h & 
(iii) -P(h) 
Hence: 
(2) -P(w) 
 
Given principle (P1), (Cd1) yields (Cal). The proponent of (C) is implicit ly relying on the truth of (Cd1), 
even though what is explicitly stated is captured by (Ca 1). 
 
Now, how does all this apply to my original argument (A)? Not surprisingly, I want to say that that 
argument is properly seen to have a form analogous to that of argument (C), not (B), and thus that it is to 
be understood along the lines of (Cd). Roughly, then, and with quantifiers omitted, what we have is an 
argument of this form: 
 
(Ad) (1) (i) -P(a & -c) & 
(ii) -c & 
(iii) –c  -P(c)  
Hence: 
(2) - P(a) 
 
More fully (although this isn't the final version): 
 
(A') (1) In any situation, very many of one's apparent options are actions which are such that 
(i) one cannot both perform them and not have certain conscious thoughts concerning them, 
(ii) one does not in fact have these thoughts,  
and 
(iii) if one does not have these thoughts, one cannot have them. 
Hence: 
(2) In any situation, very many of one's apparent options are actions which one cannot in fact 
perform. 
 
What we need now to do is look more closely at the modal principle of inference presupposed and at the 
argument's premise. 
 
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF INFERENCE 
I have said that the modal principle of inference presupposed in (Bc)—and hence, by extension, in (Cd), 
(Ad), and finally (A')—seems to be the following: 
 
-P(p & -q), -P(q) |- -P(p). 
 
It is natural to treat (P1) as akin to familiar principles of the logic of strict logical necessity and 
possibility. If we do this, we must interpret 'p' and ‗q‘ as propositional variables, and as a propositional 
connective, and `P' as a propositional operator. (P1) may then be thought to be equally well rendered as 
 
N(p q), P(p) |- P(q) 
 
(where "N" expresses personal necessity or unavoidability), and this itself may be seen to be equivalent 
to 
 
N(p q), N(p) |- N(q).
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Each of these principles is extremely plausible, but how exactly are phrases of the form "P(p)" and 
`N(p)' to be rendered in English? 
 
The best rendition, I think, is this: "P(p)" means the same as "it is personally possible for agent S at time 
t that p," and "N(p)" means the same as "it is personally necessary for S at t that p." (Just what these 
mean, I'll get to in a moment.) But here we run into a snag. So understood, (P3) (to which, it has just 
been said, (P1) is equivalent) has been used in a well-known recent argument for the thesis that free will 
is incompatible with determinism.
7
 While that argument relies on several assumptions other than the 
assumption that (P3) is valid, nonetheless some sympathizers with compatibilism have claimed that it is 
(P3) that is to be rejected. Three objections have been raised: that (P3) is invalid when p' expresses a 
proposition having to do with the past
8
; that, in its use of "N(p)," (P3) presupposes what is impossible, 
viz., that an agent can enter into a causal relation with a proposition
9
; and that (P3) begs the question 
against compatibilism
10
. I shall now address these concerns. 
 
While I believe the first objection to be mistaken, the best way to deal with it for present purposes is 
simply to circumvent it by adopting a principle that is narrower than (P3) but which still serves to 
validate the conclusion of my argument. Thus I propose the following, where t is no later than either t' or 
t* 
 
If it is not personally possible for S at t that event e occur at t' and event f not occur at t*, and if it is 
not personally possible for S at t that f occur at t*, it follows that it is not personally possible for S at 
t that e occur at t'. 
 
That is, in symbolism more explicit than that used so far: 
 
(P4) –Ps,t' (et' & ft*,), -Ps,t‘(ft*) |- -Ps,t‘(et‘).
11
 
 
The second objection can be met by giving a definition of personal possibility that employs the all-in 
"can" in such a way as to dispel any fears of pre-supposing an impossible relation between agents and 
propositions. This definition is based on the following considerations. Life is a series of choices.
12
 At 
each point of choice we are faced with a number of different directions in which we may travel. By 
travelling in one direction rather than another, we actualize one possible future and close off others. 
Each possible future is a segment of some possible world. Thus, at each point of choice, we have the 
option of actualizing one possible world rather than another.
13
 The picture is roughly this: 
 
… t1 t2 t3 t4 …  
 
 
Two comments are in order. First, this picture is inaccurate because each point of choice may have many 
more lines leading from it than are indicated here. (Nonetheless, the point of this paper is that the 
number of these lines is far smaller than is commonly believed.) Second, the picture conforms with (P4). 
If there is no line leading from a point of choice at t on which e occurs at t' and f does not occur at t*, 
and if there is no line leading from that same point of choice on which f occurs at t*, then there is no line 
leading from that point of choice on which e occurs at t'. 
 
I now suggest the following recursive definition (where a possible world is understood as a logically 
possible proposition that entails every proposition or its negation, and where "can" is all-in): 
 
(D1) It is personally possible for S at t that p =df for some possible world W: 
(i) W entails that p, and either 
(ii) S exists at t and W is actual, or  
(iii) for some choice c and time f: 
(a) S can at t make c at f, and 
(b) if (1) S were to make c at t' and 
(2) whatever S cannot at t prevent from occurring at t' were to occur at t' 
then either (3) W would obtain 
or (4) it would be personally possible for S at t' that W obtain. 
14
 
 
The third objection is more difficult to handle, because what constitutes question-begging is itself very 
unclear. I believe that there is good reason to reject the objection simply on the basis that the assumption 
that (P4) is valid does not by itself entail that compatibilism is false; as noted earlier, other assumptions 
are required. Nonetheless, some may complain that (P4) does by itself pose a threat to compatibilism, in 
that many compatibilists presuppose a conditional analysis of "can" and (P4) implies that such an 
analysis is false. Thus these compatibilists, at least, won't find (P4) innocuous. 
 
Now, whether (P4) is inconsistent with a conditional analysis of "can" of course depends on just what 
the analysis is. (P4) certainly is inconsistent with the following popular analysis: 
 
(D2) S can do a =df if S were to choose to do a, S would do a.
15
 
 
But this analysis is demonstrably false anyway.
16
 Still, it must be acknowledged that perhaps some 
conditional, compatibilist analysis of "can" could be devised, the overturning of which would require 
appealing to (P4) (or some principle implied by (P4)). In this case, there would be a stand-off. 
Independent considerations would have to be summoned in favor of the analysis on the one hand and of 
(P4) on the other. I see every reason to think that the plausibility of (P4) would outweigh any 
consideration in favor of the analysis.
17
 In saying this, I am presupposing what is surely true, namely, 
that the truth of compatibilism does not require the adequacy of any such analysis. Thus, while (P4) by 
itself may pose a threat to some compatibilists, I still believe that it poses no threat to compatibilism as 
such. 
 
III. THE PREMISE: FIRST CLAUSE 
If we are to consider the first clause of the premise in isolation, we must consider this proposition: 
 
(i) In any situation, very many of one's apparent options are actions which are such that it is not 
personally possible for one both that one perform them and that one not have have certain conscious 
thoughts concerning them. 
 
Just what the "certain conscious thoughts" are will vary from case to case, but the general point is 
simply that very many actions are such that one cannot perform them unless one pays some attention to 
what one is doing; success in one's endeavors very frequently requires that one concentrate on the task at 
hand. 
 
There may appear to be three broad classes of actions that do not satisfy this general condition. The first 
is that of unintentional actions. In reaching out for a second cup of coffee, I may "succeed" in knocking 
over the coffee pot. Doing this never crossed my mind; it certainly wasn't something that I was attending 
to. But here we may observe that, even though I was not attending to knocking over the coffee pot, I was 
attending to reaching out for a second cup of coffee; moreover, I would not have done the former unless 
I had done the latter, and doing the latter required my attention. In general, even unintentional action 
involves intentional action
18
 and must therefore involve whatever conscious thoughts intentional action 
must involve. 
 
The second class of apparent exceptions is that of routine or habitual actions. To what extent such 
actions can be performed unthinkingly is unclear. It surely is true that such actions can be performed 
without being the focus of one's attention, but whether or not they can be performed without the agent 
lending some minimal attention to them is controversial.
19
 Let us assume, however, that some routine 
actions require not even minimal consciousness of them for their successful undertaking. (Per-haps tying 
one's shoelaces, scratching an itch, changing gears, and so on, are frequently actions of this sort.) At 
most this assumption requires admit-ting that many of one's apparent options are actions which are such 
that it is personally possible for one both that one perform them and that one not have certain conscious 
thoughts concerning them. It does not require that we reject (i).
20
 
 
The third class
21
 is that of actions whose initiation appears to require certain conscious thoughts but 
whose continuation does not. Presumably, in order to begin sunbathing I must pay some attention to 
what I am doing; but it seems that I can continue doing this quite mindlessly (perhaps I am engrossed in 
the novel I'm reading). Two points are in order here. First, just as with the second class of exceptions, 
this class does not imply that (i) is false. Second, even if continuing certain actions requires no thought, 
desisting from their continuation seems to require some (while my sunbathing may stop without my 
thinking of anything, it would appear that /cannot stop it without thinking about what I am doing), and 
this observation supports (i). 
 
IV. THE PREMISE: SECOND CLAUSE 
The proposition that we must now attend to is this: 
 
(ii) In any situation, very many of one's apparent options are actions concerning which one does not 
in fact have conscious thoughts. 
 
There are two types of evidence for this claim. The first is personal. For my own part, when I 
concentrate on what I am doing, I do not attend to what I may otherwise do. When I do not concentrate 
on what I am doing, then usually my mind wanders; again, I do not attend to my options. I strongly 
suspect that most people are similar to me in these respects, although I have no firm evidence to support 
this. Of course, it can and does at times happen that I take the time to reconnoiter the territory, to 
canvass my options. Even here, though, I attend to few options at a time. And at this point the second 
type of evidence— experimental evidence—is pertinent. Apparently humans are capable of attending to 
at most five to seven independent chunks of information at once.
22
 Now, regardless of just how this 
claim is to be interpreted, it is evident that consciousness is highly selective. No one is capable of 
attending to many independent options at once; hence no one does. 
 
5. THE PREMISE: THIRD CLAUSE 
The proposition to be considered here is this: 
 
(iii) In any situation, very many of one's apparent options are actions which are such that, if one does 
not in fact have conscious thoughts concerning them, it is not personally possible for one that one 
have such thoughts. 
 
This will most likely appear to be the most vulnerable part of my argument. Why should it be necessary 
to have the thoughts in question in order for it to be possible for one to have them? Indeed, this claim is 
indefensible as it stands, but I think that a strong case can be made for a somewhat diluted version of it. 
 
First, we should ask how in general it might be personally possible for someone at t that he or she have a 
certain conscious thought at t'. There seem to be just two main possibilities. Either one has a choice at t 
as to whether one has the thought at t', or one does not. If one has a choice, then one can ensure its 
occurrence in one of two main ways. Either one already has the thought at t (or at some time t* 
intermediate between t and t') and can maintain it through t' (i.e., so act that one contributes to its 
sustenance through t'); or one does not already have the thought at t (or t*—or one has it at t (or t*) but 
fails to maintain it through t'—but can so act that one contributes to its occurrence at t'. If, on the other 
hand, one does not have a choice at t as to whether one has the thought at t', it is still personally possible 
for one at t that one have the thought at t' if, but only if, it is personally necessary for one at t that one 
have it then; that is, if, but only if, the thought occurs anyway at t', independently of any choice that one 
makes at t (or t*). In summary, then: one can have a thought just in case either one can maintain it, or 
one can contribute to it, or it will occur anyway. 
 
Let us now turn to our immediate options. By "an immediate option," I don't mean an action that can be 
completed immediately. There are no such actions, since all actions, even the most basic, take time to 
complete. Nonetheless, if there are any actions we can perform at all, there are actions that we can begin 
immediately to complete, and it is such actions that I call our immediate options. 
 
The point here is this. Given (i), very many of my immediate options are such that I cannot (begin to) 
perform them without having certain conscious thoughts. Thus, if it is personally possible for me now 
immediately to perform them, it must be personally possible for me now immediately to have the 
thoughts in question. Given the ways in which having such thoughts is personally possible, having them 
immediately is personally possible for me now only if I can now maintain them, or I can now contribute 
to them, or they will occur anyway. But it is being assumed (in the antecedent of (iii)) that I do not now 
have these thoughts; hence I cannot now maintain them. Moreover, I wish to argue, I cannot now 
contribute to their immediate occurrence; for this would require that the contribution be a basic action, 
and yet contributing to the having of a conscious thought is never (or hardly ever 
23
) a basic action. That 
is, one can accomplish such contribution only by way of some intermediate action which itself 
contributes to the having of the thought; this intermediate action must take place at a time inter-mediate 
between now and the time of the thought; hence the thought cannot be immediately produced. Thus we 
are left only with this possibility: having the thought immediately is personally possible for me now only 
if the thought occurs independently of any choice of mine now. Now, while it may be very likely that 
some thought (or thoughts) will immediately occur to me (and hence very likely that it is personally 
possible for me now to have some thought), every thought, I contend, (with one possible exception) is 
such that it is very unlikely immediately to occur to me; hence (with one possible exception) every 
thought is such that it is very un-likely that it is personally possible for me now immediately to have it.
24 
 
Why should this be, though, and what is the possible exception? Consider, first, that the number of 
independent conscious thoughts any one of which one is in principle capable of having at one time is 
extremely large (call it /V); and second, that the maximum number of independent conscious thoughts 
all of which one is capable of having at one time is very small (five to seven, as mentioned before—call 
it n). Thus, if all thoughts were equiprobable, the likelihood that on some occasion a particular one of 
them should occur would be n/N—i.e., very low indeed. Now, of course, we cannot assume that all 
thoughts are equiprobable; some are far more likely to occur than others, given the agent's past history, 
propensities, circumstances, etc. For example, one is much more likely to think of what to have for 
dinner than to wonder how much wood a woodchuck could really chuck. Indeed—and this is the 
possible exception—it may be that having a certain thought at t' is personally necessary for someone at t 
because of some choice made by him or her prior to t. In such a case it may even be likely (from a 
perspective prior to t'), rather than unlikely, that the thought in question will occur at t'. But even if this 
is so for some thoughts, it will not be so for many others. Indeed, it cannot be; for, given that at most n 
independent thoughts can occur at once, the increased likelihood of one thought tends to render others 
less likely. Thus, ironically, whatever exceptions there are prove
25
 the general rule. This is so even if we 
ignore "irrelevant" thoughts altogether and concentrate only on those that are of potential concern to the 
agent; for the number of such thoughts is still very large (call it N*) and hence n/N* is still very small.
26 
 
We may thus conclude that, in any situation, very many of one's apparent immediate options are actions 
which are such that, if one does not in fact have conscious thoughts concerning them, it is very likely not 
personally possible for one that one have such thoughts. This is significant because, conjoined with the 
other clauses of the premise, it yields (with a caveat to be explained in the next section) the conclusion 
that the number of lines immediately issuing from a point of choice is far smaller than one would 
normally think. And, of course, this restriction on the number of immediate options entails a restriction 
on the number of non-immediate, or remote, options. Still, it could yet be that the number of remote 
options is very large, and so let me now address this matter directly. 
 
Given what was said above, it is personally possible for me now that I have certain conscious thoughts 
in the non-immediate future—thoughts which I do not now have—only if I contribute to them or they 
occur anyway. That any particular such thought should occur independently of any choice or action of 
mine is just as unlikely in this case as in the case of my immediately having the thought. But, in this 
case, as opposed to the former case, there is no reason in principle to think that I cannot contribute to 
such thoughts; for time to do this is in principle available. Nonetheless, there is still good reason to think 
that, for almost any particular such thought, it is highly unlikely that I can contribute to it. Let me 
explain. 
 
I can contribute to the having of a thought in one of two ways: intentionally or unintentionally. I suggest 
that one can intentionally contribute to the having of a conscious thought only if, at the time at which the 
contribution is initiated, one has the thought. Since we are working under the assumption that I do not 
presently have the thought, the only contribution to the later having of the thought that I can now initiate 
is unintentional. Now, it seems to me that most of my conscious thoughts are indeed brought about in 
just this way: I do something which unintentionally results in my having a certain thought. But how 
likely is it that one particular thought rather than another would
27
 be unintentionally brought about on 
some particular occasion—especially when the number of immediate options is as small as I have 
argued? Again, it seems that, given the very large pool of candidate thoughts (even when restricted to 
"relevant" thoughts) and the very small number of thoughts that can be had at any one moment, we must 
conclude that the likelihood is, in almost all cases, very small.
28 
 
Here an objection may be made. It may seem that there is an intermediate path between simply 
unintentionally producing a thought and intentionally producing it, and that is the strategy of 
intentionally scanning my apparent options and thereby, given sufficient time and skill in scanning, 
latching consciously on to almost all such options, thus rendering them genuine options after all. While 
none of the thoughts that I would thereby produce would itself be intentionally produced, I would 
intentionally bring it about that such thoughts occur to me. Doesn't the fact that such scanning is 
frequently possible show that the likelihood of my having conscious thoughts concerning particular 
apparent options is in fact often quite high? 
 
The answer, I think, is still no. Although I concede that having the leisure to scan one's apparent options 
will raise the probability of each such option's being thought of and hence becoming a real option, two 
important points must be borne in mind. First, if undertaking the scanning is itself to be possible for one, 
one must have a conscious thought concerning it—and this itself may well not be very likely. Second, it 
is not enough to latch consciously on to an apparent option for it to become a real option; one must latch 
on to it at the right time. If at t1, during the course of scanning, I think of a certain possible course of 
action at t3 but at t2, during the course of further scanning, I relinquish the thought and it doesn't recur to 
me at t3, then at t3 the option that requires the thought will remain merely apparent. Now, I concede that 
having a thought raises considerably the probability of its occurring later
29
, and so my having the 
thought at t1 will raise the probability of its recurring at or during t3. Indeed, it may even render it likely 
that I will have the thought (perhaps it will occur to me to maintain the thought from t1 through t3; or 
perhaps it will occur to me to make a reminder to myself that I'll be likely to consult in time). But, as 
before, this ironically supports my general thesis. For if a certain thought is rendered likely, then, given 
the cap on the number of thoughts that may occur simultaneously, other thoughts are rendered less 
likely, so that, in general (even if there are certain particular exceptions), the likelihood of a certain 
"relevant" thought occurring to me at a certain time will be low, whether or not scanning has taken 
place.
30 
 
I therefore conclude that the following modification to (iii) is true: 
 
(iii') In any situation, very many of one's apparent options are actions which are such that, if one 
does not in fact have conscious thoughts concerning them, it is very likely not personally possible 
for one that one have such thoughts. 
 
VI. THE ARGUMENT: FINAL VERSION 
The final version of my argument must obviously reflect the modification just made to the third clause 
of the premise. But getting the final version of the premise is not just a matter of conjoining (i), (ii), and 
(iii'), because (and this is the caveat mentioned in the last section) it may be that very many x are F, very 
many x are G, and very many x are H, while it is not the case that very many x are F and G and H. I 
believe, however, that in the present case this fact presents no problem. For the considerations that were 
advanced separately in support of (i), (ii), and (iii') taken individually may, I believe, be advanced jointly 
in support of a "merged" version of these propositions. That is, it seems reasonable to believe that very 
many of the very many apparent options that satisfy (i) also satisfy (ii) and (iii'), i.e., that there is a high 
degree of overlap between them. If this seems too complacent or contentious, consider the following. 
Suppose that we made the conservative estimate that the "very many" of one's apparent options at issue 
in each of (i), (ii), and (iii') constituted only 90% of those options, and that we also made the assumption 
that there was the minimal possible overlap between the options which satisfied (i), (ii), and (iii'). The 
result would still be that 70% of one's apparent options satisfied all of (i), (ii), and (iii')—and this still 
constitutes "very many." Hence I claim that the considerations brought to bear in the preceding three 
sections furnish strong support for the following argument: 
 
(A") (1)In any situation, very many of one's apparent options are actions which are such that 
(i) it is not personally possible for one both that one perform them and that one not have 
certain conscious thoughts concerning them, 
(ii) one does not in fact have these thoughts, 
and 
(iii) if one does not have these thoughts, it is very likely not personally possible for one that 
one have them. 
Hence: 
(2)In any situation, very many of one's apparent options are actions which are such that it is very 
likely not in fact personally possible for one that one perform them. 
 
VII. MORAL IMPLICATIONS 
Joe forgot to keep his appointment; he kept interrupting his interlocutor; he ran a red light. If my 
argument is sound, it is likely that he couldn't have done otherwise. If one ought to do only what one can 
do, then it is likely not the case that Joe ought to have done otherwise. If one is responsible only for 
what one could have avoided, then it is likely not the case that Joe is responsible for what he did. Both 
theses are plausible; if they are correct, then my argument implies that there is likely much less wrong 
done and much less responsibility incurred than is commonly believed. Even if the theses are not 
correct, some close modification of them probably is, and so my argument probably still has this 
implication.
31
 At the very least, if (as is surely plausible) what one ought to do and what one is 
responsible for doing are in part functions of what options one has or had, then my argument implies 
that obligation and responsibility are often in an important respect "subjective," tied to the agent's state 
of mind. 
 
At this point it should be acknowledged that there is an ambiguity to "can," even when it is circum-
scribed as at the outset of this paper. First, there is the question whether a person under compulsion can, 
in the relevant sense, resist the compulsion. Can one, at gunpoint, defy a gunman's order? A "liberal" on 
this issue will say yes (for all it takes is the choice, admittedly a difficult one but not an impossible one, 
to decline to cooperate), while a "conservative" will say no.
32
 Then there is the question whether a 
person who cannot intentionally do something can nevertheless sometimes do it. Can one open a safe 
even when one has no idea what the combination is?
33
 Again, a "liberal" will say yes (for all it takes is a 
series of finger movements, easy to perform) while a "conservative" will say no.
34 
 
Unlike some, I am willing to declare myself a liberal. That is, as long as one has the requisite conscious 
thoughts, one can, I believe, defy the gun-man and one can open the safe. This has been the position 
implicitly adopted in this paper, for my argument applies to options even when so liberally construed. 
But what of the two moral theses just mentioned? Do they concern the liberal "can" or some more 
conservative "can"? An answer to this question need not be given here, for if my argument is sound with 
respect to the liberal "can" it is ipso facto sound with respect to some more conservative "can" and hence 
will still have the moral implications cited.
35
 
 
Throughout this paper I have construed an option to be an action that one can perform. But what of 
omissions? It may seem that there is a large class of morally significant behavior that is left untouched 
by the foregoing observations, even if they are otherwise accurate: that of satisfying negative duties. I 
can, it may be said, satisfy the duties not to kill, not to commit adultery, not to bear false witness, and so 
on, quite mindlessly; indeed, I do so whenever I am absorbed in routine activities. 
 
The easiest response to this claim is capitulation. We should, I am sure, grant that omissions in general 
and the satisfaction of negative duties in particular are sometimes options that we have, and I would be 
quite content if my case for the restricted nature of our options were itself to be restricted to our 
"positive" options (genuine actions that we can perform) so that our "negative" options ("not-doings" 
that are personally possible for us) are left untouched.
36 
 
Another response, however, is this. If one ought to do only what one can avoid doing, then the 
satisfaction of negative duties does not constitute an exception to my argument after all. Even if 
omissions are not actions
37
 and even if they are sometimes options that we have, if "ought" implies "can 
avoid" it will not be the case that I ought not to kill, or commit adultery, or bear false witness unless I 
can do these things. If, given my argument, I can rarely do these things, then I rarely have the duties in 
question. 
 
Finally, it may be claimed that my argument could be used as a basis for the thesis that we ought to 
ensure (or try to ensure) that we have certain conscious thoughts—those thoughts without which the 
duties that we would otherwise have would become defunct. This seems plausible to me, but whether or 
not it is correct can be determined only by appeal to a general theory of obligation, something that I shall 
not undertake here. Still, this much can be said: if my argument is sound, and if "ought" implies "can," it 
is very likely that one has the obligation to (try to) ensure that one has certain conscious thoughts only if 
it occurs to one to (try to) ensure this.
38 
 
NOTES 
1. More precisely: an option is either an action or an omission that one can accomplish. On 
omissions see section VII below. 
2. [1] p.319. 
3. Some have said that one can "all-in" do something just in case one has the ability and the 
opportunity to do it ([20] p. 325); others have denied this ([14] p. 242). Many have touted a 
conditional analysis (including [2] p. 282, [10] p. 159, [12] p. 104> [18] pp. 90-91, [21] p. 57); 
others have rejected this ([4] p. 345, [14] pp. 248-50, [24] p. 114ff.)—more on this later. 
4. In the "weakest" modal system> T, the following is an axiom (rather than a principle of 
inference):  
L(p q)  (Lp  Lq).  
(See [11] p. 31> where "L" and "M" are used to express strict logical necessity and possibility, 
respectively.) This is provably equivalent to:  
(-M(p & -q) & -Mq)  -Mp. 
5. See (D1) in section II for a more precise account. 
6. Again, compare the logic of strict logical necessity and possibility. See note 4 above. 
7. [24] p. 94. Actually, "N" is not agent- and time-bound in the argument as it is implicitly in (P3). 
8. [22] p. 19. 
9. [19] p. 84. Cf. [24] p. 67. 
10. [9] p. 71. Cf. [24] pp. 18> 102-4; [8] pp. 432-40. 
11. Why opt for something so complicated? Why not simply accept the following?  
If S cannot at t do action a at t' without doing action b at t*, and if S cannot at t do b at t*, it 
follows that S cannot at t do a at t'. 
The answer is this. Even if this principle is valid (as I believe), it is inapplicable to my argument 
(specifically to Aeli) because having conscious thoughts is not itself an action (although it is 
perhaps something that one "does," in some broad sense). 
12. In saying this I don't assume that all choices must be conscious. Nonetheless I am inclined to 
believe that this is so. See note 20 below. 
13. Cf. [6] p.16ff. 
14. Clause (ii) accommodates those relatively rare occasions where S is already travelling in some 
direction but cannot ever again make a choice. 
15. See the philosophers mentioned in note 3 above as ones who have advocated a conditional 
analysis. All of these writers have embraced something close to (D2). That (P4) is inconsistent 
with (D2) is shown by the following illustration. Suppose that Smith is a sensible person. He 
knows that he cannot make a cake from scratch without using flour, and so he would choose to 
make a cake from scratch only if flour were available. Moreover, if he did choose to make a cake 
from scratch, he'd succeed in doing so. Of course, he would not succeed in making a cake from 
scratch without flour if, for some bizarre reason, he were to choose to do that. It is also true, 
though, that he has no flour and that, unbeknownst to him, he has no way to get any; thus, if he 
were to choose to get flour, he'd fail to do so. Let S be Smith, m be the proposition that Smith 
makes a cake from scratch, and f be the proposition that Smith has flour. What this case tells us, 
given (D2), is this (temporal subscripts omitted): -PS(m & -f), -PS(f), but PS(m). Thus we have a 
counterexample to (P4). 
16. See [24] p. 119. Cf [7], p. 17ff. 
17. Cf. [24] p. 122. 
18. Or something close to it. See [26] p. 140. 
19. On the question of the focus of attention, see [25] Ch. 10, section 2; [13] section 35. 
20. I believe that the assumption is in fact much less far-reaching than this alone would suggest, 
however. Routine or habitual actions (given that they are wholly unthinking) seem to be 
performed on "automatic pilot," to use a common and suggestive analogy. Such actions are 
typically intentional and may involve decisions, but these decisions are not choices between 
presently competing alternatives> for the course has already been set. Routine or habit dictates 
the decisions, so that other options, even if they were once genuine, are no longer so; they have 
been ruled out. Only when one consciously backs off from the routine (because some object or 
event has forced itself upon one's consciousness-cf. [25] p. 163) do other options emerge as 
genuine candidates for choice. Thus I would contend that a conscious appraisal of one's situation 
is in fact necessary if one is to have genuine alternatives. Cf. [16] pp. 241-43, [17] p. 316. 
21. Pointed out to me by Terry McConnell. 
22. [16] pp. 236, 246ff. 
23. It may be that some people (e.g., skilled mental arithmeticians) can sometimes immediately 
conjure up some thoughts. But if this proves an exception to my argument, I take it to be one that 
is negligible. Surely it is far, far more common that thoughts can be and are evoked only 
nonbasically. 
24. The phrase "(un)likely that it is personally possible" may be disconcerting, involving as it does a 
double modality. The best antidote I can think of is simply to keep in mind that it is the all-in 
"can" that is at issue. It doesn't sound odd to say, "He can probably do that." 
25. In the sense of "confirm," and not of "test." 
26. Sample "relevant" thoughts include thoughts concerning: this project; that project; what to have 
for dinner; what's upsetting Joe; what to get Jane for her birthday; paying the car insurance 
premium; committee work... It would be tedious to extend this list; it could, and in almost all 
cases would, be very long. 
27. Or could. See clause (iiib4) of (D1). 
28. It is important that I do not presently have the thought in question and hence that any 
contribution to its later occurrence is unintentional. I concede that my presently having the 
thought would raise considerably the probability of its occurring as a result of some action that I 
can now perform. 
29. See the last note. 
30. One particular sort of exception to this general claim should be explicitly noted, however, and 
that is where the time in question is sufficiently extended. Compare my calling Sue at noon and 
my calling her by noon. It is much more likely that I can do the latter than the former, and this is 
because what constitutes the "right" time for the relevant thought to occur is much longer in the 
latter case. 
31. I believe that "ought" implies "can." I do not believe that responsibility implies avoidability, 
although I do think that one cannot be responsible for doing something unless one believed one 
could avoid doing it (as long as one is not responsible for not believing this). See [27] p. 22 and 
Ch.4, section 10. 
32. A representative liberal: Thorp ([23] pp. 8-9). A representative conservative: Dennett ([5] p. 
133). 
33. See [24] p. 230, n.9. 
34. A representative liberal: Feldman ([6] pp. 24-25). A representative conservative: Lemos ([15] p. 
302). 
35. In [27] pp. 85-6 I argued that one typically lacks control, in the second of the conservative senses 
just cited, over one's thoughts and that this would afford an excuse for much thoughtless 
behavior. My contention in this paper is that one typically lacks control even in the liberal senses 
over one's thoughts. 
36. Still, it should be noted that intentional omissions – refraining -- will often require conscious 
thoughts, just as actions often do. Thus my argument would apply to them. 
37. Although they sometimes involve them. See [26] pp. 183-84. 
38. My thanks to Josh Hoffman, John King, Terry McConnell, Al Mele, and Gary Rosenkranrz for 
helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
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